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Conclusion 
What finance manufactures 
Olivier Godechot 
 
Why should we approach the study of finance in an alternative way when 
other disciplines – such as economics and financial theory – which are older, 
more legitimate and endowed with more substantial backing, have already been 
tackling this subject for over fifty years? Admirably, despite any misgivings, the 
rapid and varied development of a collection of studies on finance has 
nonetheless originated over the last fifteen years from a variety of disciplines 
(sociology, anthropology, political science, history, management sciences, 
geography). This has resulted from the dynamic academic practice of 
diversifying and reviving research subjects, though also because of a 
dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of standard approaches. But that is not all, 
as it has equally stemmed from a desire to understand a much deeper 
phenomenon: the sudden emergence of finance in social life. 
This research, at times grouped under the heading of the ‘social studies of 
finance’ – underlining its multidisciplinary nature and its relationship with the 
social studies of science – and other times grouped under the heading of 
‘sociology of finance’ – underlining its relation with economic sociology – was 
notably developed out of several events which included a seminar held in 
France,1 regular international encounters, the setting up of an electronic 
mailing list and the publishing of several special editions of academic journals,2 
in addition to some collective works (Knorr Cetina and Preda, 2004 and 2012). 
Beyond the paradigmatic, theoretical or methodological diversity of this 
research, we can find a common approach: to study finance not only as a 
                                                 
1. Originally, the expression Social Studies of  Finance (Etudes Sociales de la Finance) was used 
in France to group together a collection of  social science approaches dealing with 
financial markets, which offered alternatives to the dominant financial and economic 
theories. This entry via science and technology studies, inspired by research from 
Callon and Latour, was a strong initial component but not the only one. Later, certain 
authors had a tendency to identify the Social Studies of  Finance in relation to this 
unique approach. 
2. Notably issue 52 of  Politix (2000), issue 21 of  Réseaux (2003), issues 146–147 of  Actes de 
la Recherche en Sciences Sociales (2003), issue 63-1 of  L’Année sociologique (2013), and finally 
the issues 92 and 93 of  Sociétés Contemporaines (2013 and 2014). 
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subject in itself, but also as a symptom of the contemporary financialisation of 
societies and their transformations. By studying the making of finance, we also 
study the magnitude of that which finance itself makes. Within these pages, we 
address the mechanisms and the social practices of contemporary capitalism 
that are often more visible in finance and are quite commonly disseminated 
across the rest of the economy from this financial hearth. After presenting 
research on contemporary financialisation, we demonstrate how the social 
studies of finance highlight three emblematic trends related to contemporary 
capitalism. These are, the – depoliticising – institutional policy of market order, 
a new knowledge regime combining academic knowledge with non-expert 
knowledge, and finally, the systematisation of ‘greed’. 
Approaching financialisation 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the financialisation of the world’s 
economy has paradoxically manifested as a trivial phenomenon experienced by 
the whole world as part of everyday life, while at the same time being a difficult 
phenomenon to clearly define, measure or explain. First, both the outline and 
the definition of financialisation are difficult to establish precisely. Common 
proxies for this phenomenon include an increase in finance’s share of the gross 
domestic product (GDP), profit or wages (Godechot, 2012 and 2013; 
Krippner, 2005; Philippon and Resheff, 2013; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 
2011). One could be led to believe that a large portion of traditional finance 
(e.g. retail banking) is not relevant to this trend, as this concept brings to mind 
first and foremost the growing importance of financial markets in our modern-
day societies. A provisional Durkheimian definition of financialisation may be 
the growing amount of social energy devoted to the trading of financial 
instruments on financial markets. The volume of transactions taking place on 
the markets would therefore be a good candidate to measure it (Godechot, 
2016b). Nevertheless, restricting financialisation to the trade of financial 
instruments would lead us to miss an important aspect. The depth of the 
subprime crisis shows that part of the traditional banking system, which 
includes mortgages (Fligstein and Goldstein, 2010), consumer credit or credit 
cards (Poon, 2009), has been deeply affected by new ideas stemming from 
financial markets, for example commodification, securitisation, liquidity, 
diversification, standardisation, fair value accounting, mathematical pricing 
models and delta-hedging techniques for arbitrage. Financialisation therefore 
cannot be limited to the growth of financial markets, but should instead be 
understood as the spread of the financial market’s core logic beyond the 
bounds of its original sphere.  
Second, the causes of financialisation are far from clear. Traditional 
explanations, in terms of demands for financial services or links between 
financial services and economic growth, struggle to account for long-term 
trends (Philippon and Resheff, 2013). Deregulation policies have played a 
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significant role in this movement (ibid.), specifically with respect to all the pro-
market policies detailed in the section that follows. In the same line, the 
combination of advances in financial theory and new technologies equally 
contributed to perform new markets (cf. third section). However, it would also 
appear that once the initial favourable conditions are aligned, market finance 
also increases in accordance with endogenous mechanisms (into which more 
research is still needed), creating as such a phenomenon of path dependency. 
Third, the consequences of financialisation have not yet been fully 
measured. Traditionally, the main issue in economics is finance’s contribution 
to economic growth, financial and economic stability and global crises (Aglietta 
and Rébérioux, 2004; Artus et al., 2008). A growing section of the research also 
underlines finance’s substantial impact on the increase of inequalities (Atkinson 
et al., 2011), due to the high-income salaries distributed at its core (Bell and 
Van Reenen, 2014; Godechot, 2012). It has also contributed substantially to 
spatial segregation and the increase in salary differences between global cities 
and hinterlands (Godechot, 2013), as well as to inequalities within non-
financial firms (Goldstein, 2012; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013), notably 
due to the promotion of new forms of management and new ways of 
conceptualising companies, based exclusively on their financial value. Finally, 
financialisation emerges by activating powerful mechanisms (both within and 
outside of its own field) that will be further detailed in the following pages of 
this chapter. 
A depoliticising policy: the institution of  markets 
Market exchange has not always been thought of as a fundamentally 
apolitical act. As such, during the emergence of the London Stock Market, at 
the beginning of the eighteenth century, transactions for certain securities took 
place preferentially between members of the same party, either the Whigs or the 
Tories (Carruthers, 1996). In the context of consecutive political rivalry at the 
time of the Glorious Revolution, these two parties, whether by safeguarding it 
or conquering for it, indeed sought to maintain their control over the principal 
institutions lending money to the State and, in doing so, either establish or 
defend their own power over the State. The initial political dimension of 
financial exchange, especially visible in England during the eighteenth century, 
was nonetheless obscured by the effectively symbolic work of depoliticisation. 
De Goede (2005) provides a striking example of this process by revisiting the 
narrow and fragile threshold that financial markets established in the United 
States between gambling – unlawful and often forbidden – and financial 
speculation – which was considered lawful. Consequently, US stock market 
representatives succeeded in establishing, in the eyes of the authorities, a 
contrast between two very similar practices. The first being bets placed on 
prices that took place in certain cafés known as bucket shops, that were thought 
to exploit an irrational passion for gambling and destabilise the markets, and 
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the second being futures trading on the stock markets by speculators, who 
were presumed to conduct sound calculations and therefore stabilise prices 
through their actions. De Goede thus proposes the groundwork for a 
Foucauldian history of financial markets which, through re-politicising 
institutions that present themselves in a naturalised and depoliticised manner, 
thus demonstrates the very contingent, political and in fine amendable nature of 
financial markets. 
Financial markets are hence paradoxically political. They deny their political 
character by highlighting the primacy of financial interest and the non-partisan 
nature of their equilibria (above all guided by the principles of economics). 
However, in parallel, the principle financial maxim – that prices represent the 
value of securities – is no less than a political affirmation that implies 
furthermore a specific social order (Ortiz, 2013, 2014a and 2014b). The 
paradoxically (a)political market order is not only the result of the endogenous 
dynamic of the financial sphere, it also owes its existence to policies related to 
the creation or the deepening of financial markets. 
Montagne (2006) accordingly retraces the very specific legal conditions 
within the framework of which US pension funds, one of the pillars of 
contemporary financialisation, have been able to prosper. In actual fact, they 
depend upon a type of contract that is hardly representative of classical 
liberalism, known as a trust, which originates from the feudal world and that 
deems the beneficiary (the employee) a minor. The State’s imperative to 
protect this individual as such leads less towards a freeing-up of the contract, 
than it does towards the surveying of trustees. In particular, the 1974 Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) urges pension funds to follow ‘good 
financial practices’ and forbids them to take into account any additional 
interests (such as retaining the recipients’ employment) other than the financial 
interests of their employee recipients. This Act in fine moves less towards giving 
employees control over finance, than it does towards sealing off finance within 
itself. 
Quite paradoxically, pro-market policy has not always been promoted solely 
by financial circles but also quite often by coalitions. Such coalitions were 
formed between social movements, finance groups and progressive 
governments – desiring to open up financing possibilities for those most in 
need or to improve market competition. Fligstein and Goldstein (2010) 
consequently illustrate how the development of Mortgage Backed Securities was 
initiated by the Johnson administration in the context of its Great Society 
project. The US government had discovered that this type of security, backed 
by major governmental mortgage agencies (Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac), 
could be an innovative solution for promoting access to property for those on 
the inferior fringes of the middle class, without fuelling the then-threatening 
inflation. As Krippner (2011) has shown, the dismantling of the Glass-Steagall 
Act – which since the 1930s separated investment banking from commercial 
banking – and more specifically, the dismantling of one of its emblematic 
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measures, the Q Regulation – which limited interest rates on loans and deposits 
– were also brought on by social movements led by progressive actors such as 
Ralph Nader. Across the Atlantic in France, the major market transformation 
was carried out during the 1980s by the socialist government who, following 
the failure of stimulus policies, opted to promote market socialism (Lagneau-
Ymonet and Riva, 2012). 
So, in spite of all this, are financial markets wholly embedded in institutions 
and institutional policies – including those that strive for dis-embeddedness 
(Gayon and Lemoine, 2014)? Fligstein initiated this particular research 
programme by illustrating that traditional company governance, notably 
distinguished by its promotion of the multi-divisional firm and managers who 
originate from finance departments, owes a lot to legislation changes in the 
1950s that limited vertical and horizontal integration in the name of 
competition (Fligstein, 1990). Numerous studies have shown that the multi-
divisional firm model, whose privileged objectives were diversification and 
expansion, ceded its place to an organisational model focused on creating 
shareholder value (Fligstein, 2001) and entirely centred on its core business 
activities, with the aim of maximising the company’s stock market value. The 
firm was therefore split into as many profit centres as there were elementary 
units, with the value of each being measured in light of its potential resale on 
the market. A symptom of this transformation was the increasing power 
attributed to finance directors heading up companies and their appointment as 
chief financial officers (CFO), replacing chief operating officers (COO) (Zorn, 
2004; Zorn et al., 2005). Clearly present at the outset of this movement is an 
institutional source, namely the transformation of the US tax system at the end 
of the 1970s (Zorn, 2004). The movement continued however thanks to the 
promotion of the shareholder value creation ideology, the 1980s hostile 
takeovers and the heightened role of financial analysts in determining prices 
(Zorn et al., 2005). It also owed much to a logic endogenous to the economic 
field of the 1980s, which reunited and opposed three types of actors against 
one another. First off, the firm CEOs wanting to defend their power and their 
remuneration. Next, the corporate raiders who through leveraged buyout 
transactions – enabled thanks to the development of junk bonds – took control 
of major companies (or threatened to do so) in order to brutally restructure 
them. And finally, institutional investors, notably pension funds, preoccupied 
with avoiding certain transactions that could affect them negatively, such as 
greenmailing – when firms buyback shares from raiders for prices higher than 
those on the market (Heilbron et al., 2014). The diffusion of the shareholder 
value ideology, which favours less the shareholder than it does those said to 
represent them (Jung and Dobbin, 2016; Goldstein, 2012), owes more to the 
‘field logic’ than to a single actor, even if that actor happens to be the State 
itself (Heilbron et al., 2014). 
Approaching finance, its origins and its development, via its institutional 
embeddedness avoids turning financialisation into a self-emerging 
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phenomenon that materialises out of thin air. Even though institutions do not 
provide an explanation for everything, they certainly play the role of founder 
and initiator. Moving beyond this initiator’s role, policy from state institutions 
during the financial cycles of deregulation–crisis–reregulation (Abolafia, 1996), 
notably that of the central bank (Fligstein and Goldstein, 2010; Krippner, 
2011), has also been found to be stunningly short-sighted and incapable in the 
US of predicting the formation of a bubble or of softening the blow after it has 
burst. This is also the case with policy from governments, who only succeed in 
putting into place effective, less costly and restrictive rescue plans once the 
banking industry has managed to collectively coordinate itself under the 
leadership of its key players urged on by their declining health (Woll, 2014). 
A new regime of  knowledge 
The Social Studies of Finance not only examine how modern finance has taken 
root institutionally, they also consider the new regime of knowledge that 
finance encourages, which is characterised by a strong, but also transformative 
interaction between professional and academic knowledge. It is less a question 
of contesting such professional and academic knowledge, than it is of taking it 
up as subjects for study; and doing so consequently enables researchers to 
show how finance itself is structured and transformed by financial science. 
The Social Studies of Finance (SSF) are therefore the principal grounds on 
which a research programme studying ‘performativity’3 has been established, 
first launched by Michel Callon in 1998. According to Callon, the at times 
ritual criticism of neo-classical economics found in economic sociology articles 
is both unproductive and inaccurate. On the contrary, the utopian idea of homo 
œconomicus has re-emerged as ‘economics, in the broad sense of the term, 
performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how it 
functions’ (Callon, 1998). This revival of John Austin’s concept has flourished 
in the field of SSF, to the point where several authors have considered it a key 
theme. The research produced as a result of this movement has shown that 
scientific statements are no longer just observations but, much like the 
celebrant’s words ‘I now declare you husband and wife’, they also have the 
ability to transform the reality about which they speak. 
In line with this perspective, Muniesa (2000; 2007) established a genealogy 
related to a minor innovation, which occurred on the Paris Stock Market: the 
introduction of a fixing auction at market close.4 This auction resulted from the 
                                                 
3. Developed in a collection of  works published in 1962 by the philosopher Austin (How to 
do things with words), the concept of  ‘performativity’ describes the characteristic of  
language that is its influence over the reality it describes. 
4. Fixing here refers to a discrete call auction wherein the auctioneer has taken time to 
gather together all the sales and purchasing orders before establishing the price. It sits 
in opposition to continuous trading, where as soon as an offering price equals the 
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crossing over of two quite distinct areas of activity. On one side, there were the 
market engineers, anxious about potential end-of-day manipulations with 
regard to establishing the closing price, a reference for many market 
agreements. On the other side, researchers from the academic world concerned 
with either financial theory or auction theory, who were comparing the quality 
of prices in various market structures. Organising a fixing auction for the 
market close, ten minutes after the end of continuous trading, appeared to be 
an elegant solution for establishing market equilibrium – à la Walras. It 
produced ‘good quality’ prices, founded on the accumulation of all sale and 
purchase offers made over a substantial period of time, and it was a very good 
response to the practical problem of price manipulation. It was enforced 
contrary to an alternative solution used on other stock markets, that of 
calculating an average of the prices 30 minutes before close, a solution 
considered by stock market experts to be more artificial and less revealing in 
terms of market forces. The field of economics therefore acted as a source of 
inspiration and, combined with market engineering, thus contributed towards 
performing the organisation of financial transactions. 
MacKenzie (2006), examining the fate of the Black Scholes formula in the 
financial industry, analysed another even more distinct case of the 
performativity of economics. In 1973 Black and Scholes published a theoretical 
solution to a then canonical academic issue in financial economics, that of the 
value of an option, a type of contract offering the right – but imposing no 
obligation – to buy a particular share on a given date. By modelling share prices 
as a Log-normal random walk, the two economists showed that the price of an 
option is a function of several elements, which included its duration, the 
interest rate, the price and the volatility of the share in question. When the two 
theorists began testing the formula on past data, they found it incorrectly 
described the relations between prices. However, a short time after the formula 
was published, prices began to behave just like it had indicated. 
The various stages of this example of ‘performativity’ have been explained 
in detail by MacKenzie. In the mid-1970s, the price listings were sold off by 
one of the formula’s creators. These listings described the theoretical value of 
options in relation to the evolution of current market prices. They were 
subsequently used by traders on the market to locate expensive and cheap 
options, allowing them to engage in arbitrage by selling off the former and 
buying up the latter. This ‘performing’ of the market in line with the formula, 
insists MacKenzie, does not correspond to a situation whereby the market 
adopts the ‘only genuine solution’ to the problem of pricing. The formula 
relied on noteworthy approximations and simplifications, in particular the 
hypothesis of the Log-normality of prices, that is to say the very weak 
probability of extreme variations. The crash of 1987 during which the market 
fell by more than 20 per cent in a single day would have been improbable 
                                                                                                                            
sales price, a transaction is concluded. 
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according to the modelling used above. Financial theory, which deals with the 
pricing of complex financial products and portfolio allocation, therefore 
overturns the rationale of scientific discovery. In essence, it transforms 
financial reality to a much greater extent than it uncovers the relations that 
structure it. 
Such ‘performing’ is not limited to canonical theories of financial science. 
Certain seemingly insignificant technical mechanisms of representation can 
play a determining role in the action. Zuckerman (1999; 2004) as such 
underlines the impact of categories employed by actors. In his work, financial 
analysts are seen to perceive firm value through economic sectors. Categories 
are therefore all the more meaningful to analysts in that they constitute a 
framework for their professional specialisation. Multi-sector firms, incoherent 
from the perspective of categorical division, are therefore often monitored by 
analysts coming from vastly different specialisations. This incoherent network 
position generates fewer, less favourable and more contradictory valuations; 
consequently prompting the undervaluation of a company’s securities on the 
stock market, in addition to triggering stronger volatility and higher transaction 
volumes when results are announced. 
It is impossible though to reduce the scientific research programme 
analysing the regime of financial knowledge to the study of the performativity 
of academic financial theory. For one reason, it is not always performed with 
success (Jung and Dobbin, 2016). In certain cases, even counter-performativity 
could be mentioned (MacKenzie, 2006), particularly that of the anomalies 
revealed by behavioural finance. Even just the naming of anomalies (such as 
the 1st of January effect, which is the likelihood of a price rise occurring on 
this date) can lead to their disappearance (simply through the exploitation of 
opportunities for arbitrage). For another reason, the programme of 
performativity often forgets to include cultural, social and institutional reasons 
that can lead to different theories being adopted. The programme of 
performativity can therefore be expanded via a study of financial reasoning in 
all its diversity (Tadjeddine, 2000). 
Smith (1999) is without doubt one of the first sociologists to propose a 
detailed analysis of financial beliefs and behaviours through the development 
of a gallery of flamboyant profiles that feature financial participants. He 
distinguishes six diverse categories of true believers who think the market is 
systematically governed by forces. First up are the ‘Fundamentalists’, who 
believe that economic forecasts, in particular those related to dividends, are 
what determine prices. Next, there are those partial to the theory of ‘Insiders’ 
who believe prices are determined by major players who have access to 
privileged information, which leads them to lie in wait for any related rumours. 
The Cyclist-Chartists make their predictions on the basis of ‘resistance lines’, 
straight lines they trace between the extrema (maxima and minima) of prices. 
Then there are the proponents of the Trader style, who follow their feelings 
trying to sense the market’s movements, while Efficient Market Believers 
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consider that the only thing that matters is accurately replicating the global 
market in their portfolios. Finally, the ‘Transformational Idea Adherents’ seek 
out economic ideas likely to radically change the world, like for example the 
‘new economy’. 
Less specific with regard to the spread of possible beliefs and their ways of 
functioning, within my own research (Godechot, 2001, 2016a) I have examined 
a variety of financial practices identified in trading rooms involved in the 
commercialisation and arbitrage of sophisticated derivatives, and have 
established connections between these and individual career paths in finance, 
the capital owned by actors and, lastly, the structure of the positions they 
occupy in the room. Social and educational background, in addition to the 
means of initiation into financial activities, which often occurs via a mentor, 
produce ways of seeing the market that are not only persistent, but that also 
represent a system of likes and dislikes – that never runs dry of tireless 
controversies – similar in a way to the debates commonly found amongst IT 
users: Mac or PC, Windows or Linux, etc. As it were, three financial strategies 
that are easily identified via a questionnaire – mathematical arbitrage, chartist 
analysis and economic analysis – stand opposed to one another in that they 
create opposition between individuals who either come from different 
educational backgrounds or who hold different positions in the trading room 
or who maintain different market perspectives. Followers of mathematical 
arbitrage here find an alternative way of continuing the preparatory school 
where they developed an enchanted relationship with academic knowledge. 
Like the followers of economic analysis, they often find chartists to be inept, 
and the two compete to provide explanations for its wholly unfounded use. 
They are however also quite often opposed to macro-economic analysis as, 
according to them, it lacks precision. Followers of this latter analysis in 
contrast highlight the limited character of arbitrage; i.e. the small wins, which 
deep down are not based on a global understanding of the market, but only on 
the very narrow relations between various securities from the same family. 
Finally, the followers of chartist analysis, often hailing from working class 
backgrounds, hold in high regard the counter-cultural side of this pagan-like 
knowledge. Although its methods generally lead to ambiguous 
recommendations, they believe charts enable them to outdo even those 
financial actors using the most legitimate forms of knowledge (Godechot, 
2008a). This description of these three opposing camps jostling around within 
one space – connected by a continuum of hybrid positions much like a ‘bazaar 
of rationality’, where everyone brings what they have to offer and positions 
themselves in relation to what others are offering, seeking to both associate 
and differentiate themselves from one another – allows us to think differently 
about rationality; and not just as an a priori given for social actors, like 
economists’ models make it out to be, but as a structural process for acquiring 
and constructing reasoning (Godechot, 2016a). The guiding principle of this 
bazaar of rationality is therefore, either consciously or unconsciously, 
‘economic’, as it incites individuals to take up those techniques for which they 
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feel the most affinity, for which they possess the most capital and the necessary 
predisposition. Concerning the nature of the market, this debate between 
supporters of different methods in one way shows that the market is a reflexive 
institution. The market is neither fundamentalist, nor chartist, nor does it 
conform to mathematic efficiency. It is instead the product of this clash 
between differing points of view (Godechot, 2008a). 
If knowledge is at this point constitutive of contemporary finance, we can 
therefore deduce that the financial crisis itself is also a matter of knowledge. As 
has been convincingly demonstrated by Donald MacKenzie (2011) in relation 
to the subprime crisis. The most toxic financial products, the MBS-CDOs – debt 
obligations backed by mortgage portfolios – were potentially born from two 
types of knowledge, one relative to mortgage securitisation (for the first stage 
of securitisation) and the other relative to corporate bonds securitisation (for 
the second stage of securitisation). Banks and ratings agencies, however, 
entrusted the valuation of mortgage products to services involved in the 
securitisation of corporate bonds, who in doing so transposed logical reasoning 
specific to the valuation of corporate bonds portfolios across to MBS-CDOs. 
However, in contrast with corporate portfolios, there are no price series for 
mortgage portfolios enabling the autocorrelation of defaults and anticipated 
repayments to be calculated. To make up for this lack of information, the 
banks and ratings agencies adopted an arbitrary level of correlation (a 
‘Gaussian Copula’) of 0.3, which corresponded to the mean autocorrelation for 
defaults by firms within the same sector. The avalanche of defaults following 
the 2007 interest rate rise shows that this conceptual decision, the product of a 
conceptual and social division of labour in asset valuation activities, seriously 
underestimated the autocorrelation of defaults, leading as a result to the most 
serious financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
The systematisation of  ‘greed’ 
The unilaterality of the challenges uniquely faced in finance – namely, 
providing profit for corporations and bonuses for employees – in addition to 
the degree of technicality involved in economic calculations and transaction 
arrangements, and the lively competition that rules over markets, all contribute 
towards developing the autonomous separation of this field from others, in 
addition to establishing highly rationalised practices. Numerous authors 
(Abolafia, 1996: 14–37; Godechot, 2001; Zaloom, 2006: 111–125) have 
examined this Weberian process of behaviour rationalisation and questioned 
whether the financial world was not in some way contributing to bringing the 
fictional being of homo œconomicus (Callon, 1998) into actual existence, thanks to 
work spaces equipped with computing systems, the continuous accounting of 
business activity and, most importantly, due to strong monetary incentives. 
Studying incentives is a good way of understanding rationalisation, because 
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their impact is without doubt more striking in this sphere than elsewhere. 
However, carrying out such a study means avoiding two pitfalls. The first 
involves considering rationalisation to be so powerful that it will ultimately 
culminate in the arrival, at the heart of the financial markets, of a perfect and 
accomplished homo œconomicus, wholly validating the scientific approaches 
(mainstream economics) founded exclusively on this hypothesis, even if done so 
for ‘ill-founded reasons’, eventually rendering any development of alternative 
approaches redundant. The second pitfall consists of believing that all 
incentives have been rationally calibrated in order to produce behaviours 
aligned in favour with the shareholder’s interests. 
Emphasising more or less this dimension, ethnographic studies show that 
compensations, in particular bonuses, constitute the gravitational centre of 
financial activity (Abolafia, 1996; Godechot, 2001 and 2016c; Ortiz, 2014a; 
Roth, 2006; Zaloom, 2006). High remuneration indeed greatly steers 
behaviours, though without achieving the equilibrium described by neoclassical 
economics. Indeed, on the whole the extremely elevated compensation levels 
present in finance illustrate that neither the financial securities market, nor the 
financial labour market are efficient. If salaries were to follow the predictions 
provided by principal-agent models, then they would consist of a much lower 
fixed salary, even a negative salary (< 0), so that the utility in these financial 
roles would be equivalent to that encountered in non-financial professions that 
require the same skills (Godechot, 2011 and 2016c). The fact that certain 
employees are able to acquire the power to hold-up a corporation constitutes a 
better explanation for the level of wages than the idea of optimal incentives to 
work hard (Godechot, 2016c). Studying an exemplary case concerning hold-
ups allows us to stylise how salaries are actually determined. In 2000, two 
trading room managers working for a major bank obtained €10 and €7 million 
in bonuses by brandishing the credible threat to leave and take the teams they 
managed with them to a rival bank. This case illustrates the logic of the hold-
up, namely that having control of transferable assets provides the means to 
threaten the company with damages if they refuse a renegotiation that favours 
the employee. This technique is even more frequent considering that 
protection against it is relatively inefficient. It leads us to observe the financial 
industry’s labour market in a different way; as though it was less like a market 
representing people and individual skills, and more like a market of corporate 
assets collectively produced and carried off by people who organise their 
transfer (Godechot, 2014). 
Studying compensation is also important for understanding financial 
behaviours. Following the crisis, the wider public and most economists 
emphasised the fact that remunerations could encourage risk-taking and help 
to explain the crisis (Cheng et al., 2015). To this well-known element, perhaps 
overestimated in the public debate, we can add another that remains 
underrated (Godechot, 2008b). Bonuses not only lead to excess risk-taking (with 
only the positive amount of the profit being rewarded, while negative amounts 
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carry no penalties), they also lead to the deformation of risk measurement or 
more precisely the politicisation of risk measurement in financial corporations. 
Indeed, as long as the equivalent of 100–200 per cent of the bulk of fixed 
salaries is distributed each year in the form of bonuses and as long as these 
bonuses depend on accounting measures based on the revenues net of the 
costs of risk, then the temptation to underestimate the risks incurred so as to 
maximise bonuses will remain great, and even more so when they involve new 
financial products that are difficult to value. Moreover, in major banks, risk 
management departments do not fully assume their supervisory role. To begin 
with, faced with this role, front office staffs enjoy great legitimacy and a powerful 
ability to impose certain risk measurements on other parties, to inherently 
favour their own position. Second, bonuses for risk management departments 
often depend at least indirectly on the percentage of the bonus pool duly 
granted to the front office. Finally, those in risk management often have their 
sights set on trading professions. They must therefore monitor people for 
whom they would very much like to work for in the future. This therefore 
means not being too overzealous, so as to avoid upsetting them. 
This greed-based logic also fuels the two additional logics discussed above: 
the depoliticising institution of markets and the transformational overlapping 
of academic and professional knowledges. The article by Jung and Dobbin 
(2016) articulates how the partial performing of the neoclassical academic 
theory of firms, which promotes a depoliticised firm uniquely at the service of 
its shareholders, owes much to the remuneration conditions of portfolio 
managers handling pension funds. Paid in the form of bonuses, they promote 
the elements of this theory in line with this form of extremely short-term 
compensation, and abandon all others. 
Conclusion: the advance of  finance 
This overview of social studies research centred on finance, which is 
undoubtedly incomplete, aims to illustrate the advance of finance, in the dual 
sense of the term. On one hand, illustrating the progress finance has made and, 
on the other, the lead it has taken ahead of other economic sectors and more 
generally the rest of society. A comprehensive evaluation of the social effects 
of this advance has, as yet, only just begun. While mainstream economics 
generally tends to underline any shared benefits, other social sciences, which 
are more critical, often focus exclusively on the costs. Although finance 
subjects (certain) people to new constraints, it also liberates (others) from 
traditional dependencies (Fontaine, 2014). As a final example of this, the 
development of credit scoring in the US clearly demonstrates how transforming 
the way credit equivalences are established can alter the types of actors who are 
either favoured or disfavoured. The credit score system indeed replaces a 
method of credit distribution founded on affiliations with specific categories 
12 
(i.e. gender, race, age) and local social reputations, with one instead founded on 
one’s personal debt and repayment history (Fourcade and Healy, 2013; Poon, 
2009). Furthermore, the academic debate a propos the costs and benefits of the 
advance of finance is but a subset of the political and social debate surrounding 
this same issue. Policy choices reflect a reorientation in relation to this subject. 
After three decades of policies stimulating the advance of finance, now, 
following the 2008 financial crisis, societies instead seek to contain it without, 
for the moment, having found the necessary solutions. 
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